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The Dynamics of Outsourcing and Offshoring Business Models: Insights 
from Engineering Support Services 
by Katy Mason and Martin Spring 
ABSTRACT 
The growing academic attention given to outsourcing and offshoring reflects a trend 
to develop offshore business models that capitalises on both the effectiveness and 
efficiencies that might be offered by the business network.  Recent innovations in 
information communications technologies have made transacting and co-ordination 
business activities at a distance much easier.  However, managers still face the 
challenge of working out what they can offshore and how – an issue paid little 
attention in the extant offshore literature.  Using empirical data from an engineering 
firm who decides to outsource and offshore high value services for the first time, this 
paper examines transaction costs, transactions and firm capabilities in a way that 
allows us to consider the issues surrounding how managers identify and define the 
transactions to be carried out.  Drawing on the theory of mundane transaction cost 
and indirect capabilities, our findings suggest that; 1) the firms in the offshore 
business model need to develop and understand the indirect capabilities of the 
multiple firms in the network – what can our network help us do?  2) mundane 
transaction costs are necessarily dynamic because they exist in a time of rapid and 
disruptive change and 3) being able to identify what is to be transacted has 
fundamental implications for both efficiency and effectiveness that can be achieved 
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INTRODUCTION 
Past research has generated valuable insights into the nature of outsourcing (Fill and 
Visser 2000, p.149; Quinn 1999), offshoring (Dawson and Pyle 1991; Farrell 2006; 
Levy 2005) and the purchasing of high value business services (Axelsson and Wynstra 
2002).  However, the combination of all three represented by the offshore 
outsourcing of services presents novel challenges for managers. Offshoring has been 
a common strategy in manufacturing for decades, rapidly growing in prominence 
since the 1980s.  The economic growth of developing countries such as China and 
India has witnessed their progression to  as centres of manufacturing (Ferdows 
1997).  The specific challenges surrounding offshoring relate to spatial and relational 
proximity of the organisations trying to work together (see for example, Sturgeon 
2003).  There is a growing body of literature describing the business models adopted 
to deal with these challenges (Doh 2005; Khan and Fitzerald 2004).  Lewin and 
Peeters (2006) identify two distinct offshoring models: the captive model, where the 
offshore centre is owned and operated by the offshoring company, and the 
outsourced model, which involves the outsourcing of a products, services or 
functions to an offshore third-party.   
 
Outsourcing is as old as industry itself, of course, but has become an increasingly 
widely-used strategy by private and public sectors alike (Domberger 1998; McIvor 
2005).  Similarly, services have been subject to separate study in operations 
management and marketing since the 1960s (Levitt 1972; Sampson and Froehle 
2006). But technological innovations and improved infrastructures of the emerging 
market economies have brought these three phenomena together.   Metters and 
Verma (2008) paint a telling historical picture of the speed with which large-scale 
offshoring of information-based services – either in-house or outsourced – has been 
made possible by the striking capacity, speed and cost improvements in 
contemporary information and communications technology.  This has transformed 
the sector in the past ten years. 
 
Recent studies of offshore outsourcing of services have dealt with a number of 
important themes. Offshoring involves distance – geographical, cultural, linguistic – 
and so is assumed to involve added risk. Outsourcing has typically been analysed 
using Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to explore the ‘hold-up’ problem 
(Williamson 1985) supposed to result from opportunistic behaviour of suppliers. 
Services, especially knowledge-intensive or higher value-added services, are 
presumed to accentuate these problems of risk and opportunism because they are 
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‘intangible’ and therefore difficult to monitor in respect of quality. A quotation from 
a recent paper in this vein illustrates: 
‘When a firm outsources services it should expect to have significant potential 
for overpayment and under-servicing’ (Ellram et al. 2008, p.157)  
 
In short, the combination of the three – offshoring, outsourcing and services – is 
taken to make everything more difficult for the client firm. And yet the potential 
savings and other benefits that result from labour rate differentials and access to 
highly skilled staff make it worthwhile. The overall challenge is to manage and 
mitigate the difficulties that may arise and maximise the benefits.  
 
The empirical domain of this study is a single case study in the offshore outsourcing 
of engineering services. As Lewin and Peeters (2006) note, the extent of outsourced 
offshoring of engineering services - 62% outsourced versus 38% captive - is 
somewhat surprising, being as it might be considered a relatively critical, knowledge-
intensive activity.  Recently the specific challenges associated with this type of 
offshoring have begun to receive increasing attention.  However, to-date this 
literature has tended to adopt a TCE perspective and, for this reason, has examined 
the operationalisation problems of offshore business models from the point where 
the transactions that are to take place have already been identified and explicated.  
Yet our research suggests that organisations face significant challenges in working 
out what these transactions should be.  The purpose of this paper is to explore how 
firms work out what is to be transacted in an offshore services context.  
 
We begin with a review of the services offshoring literature and examine the way 
this literature looks at transaction costs, transactions and firm capabilities in a way 
that allows them to identify and define transactions to be carried out.  We then 
present the method section and our empirical findings from the case study of a firm 
attempting to develop a services offshore business model.  A discussion about how 
firms might make offshore transaction possible follows.  Finally we present the 
conclusions and implications of our study. 
THEMES AND GAPS IN THE SERVICES OFFSHORING LITERATURE 
Three themes emerge strongly from the recent literature that is explicitly devoted to 
the offshoring of services. The first is a TCE-based analysis (Ellram et al. 2008; 
Stratman 2008), which draws attention to the risks associated with investment in 
specific assets and the supposed attendant hold-up problems under the assumption 
of opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, and provides a basis for deciding which 
services, under which environmental conditions, are suitable for offshore 
outsourcing. The second, particularly in operations strategy, is the determination of 
the most appropriate design of the network of service delivery facilities, particularly 
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in respect of location, based on the extent of customer contact and customisation 
involved in the service offering. Such analyses (e.g. Metters 2008) have considered 
variations on the domestic/offshore dichotomy such as ‘homeshoring’, nearshoring 
and so forth. Once again, the decision attempts to find the optimum balance 
between the cost savings on the one hand and the problems arising from various 
forms of distance on the other. The third theme, predominant in the IS literature, 
draws less attention to the potential for opportunism in the user-provider 
relationship; rather, it examines collaboration and co-ordination mechanisms by 
which potential difficulties arising from the hierarchical relationship between user 
and provider (captive or outsourced) may be mitigated (Levina and Vaast 2008; 
Olsson et al. 2008). The focus on inter-firm coordination rather than, or at least as 
well as, opportunism has a strong pedigree in the IS literature (Clemons et al. 1993).  
 
All these themes – when to outsource/offshore (TCE), how to design the service 
delivery system (operations strategy) and how best to coordinate with the supplier 
(IS) - assume an ability to determine ex ante what it is that is to be outsourced and or 
offshored. For example: ‘service processes need to be seen as potentially de-
coupled’ (Metters and Verma, 2008, p 146); ‘the value proposition of these standard 
services is generally well understood’ (Stratman 2008, p 278). Furthermore, the TCE 
approaches all emphasise the transaction costs arising from potential opportunism, 
neglecting the more routine ‘frictional’ costs of delineating what is to be outsourced 
and or offshored in the first place. We suggest that these ‘frictional’ costs, far from 
being incidental, are central to the challenges firms face when rapidly implementing 
an offshoring strategy. In order to develop this argument, we now introduce the key 
theoretical ideas on which we draw mundane transaction costs (MTC) and 
capabilities. 
TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND CAPABILITIES 
TCE has been widely used to examine outsourcing per se – indeed, it is a theory of 
outsourcing – and, lately, to examine offshoring. The focus here is on opportunistic 
behaviour by the supplier (for a recent example, see Ellram et al. 2008). The 
argument goes that, given that services1 - especially complex or knowledge-intensive 
services - are supposed to be more difficult to specify and monitor than products and 
that, with offshoring, distances (geographic, cultural, linguistic) are increased, 
opportunism is more of a risk. This neglects a number of other interpretations and 
facets of transaction costs that are just as important.  Perhaps this is because of the 
‘intriguing’ nature of ‘stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets 
                                                 
1
 Ellram et al. (2008) actually claim to be treating professional services, but the activities they include 
are not, for the most part, what would be recognized as professional services, but more-or-less 
knowledge-intensive services (e.g. on delineation of professional services, see Glückler, J and T 
Armbrüster (2003), "Bridging uncertainty in management consulting: the mechanisms of trust and 
networked reputation," Organization Studies, 24 (2), 269-97. 
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placed at risk’ (Langlois 2006), which are what the analysis of asset specificity and 
opportunism – hold-up problems – is concerned with. Other more routine or 
mundane concerns attract less attention. 
 
As noted by Lewin and Peeters (2006), one of the emerging issues of offshoring is 
that ‘firms will have to learn new capabilities involving the ability to source, locate, 
organize and manage human capital globally’ *p234+.  It is these capabilities, and 
their acquisition, which are a strong theme in the argument here. These are explored 
in some detail using the notion of mundane transaction costs (Baldwin and Clark 
2006; Baldwin 2008; Langlois 2006) which, broadly speaking, are the routine and 
unavoidable costs of making products and services tradable between economic 
entities. In other words, MTC theory helps specify what transactions will take place.  
Furthermore, drawing on a capabilities perspective, we argue that dynamic 
transaction costs (Langlois and Robertson 1995; Langlois 1992) add a further level of 
understanding in situations such as outsourcing where the structure of the supply 
network is being changed – something to which Williamsonian TCE is rather blind. 
Finally, returning to Lewin and Peeters’ (2006) point about the need for firms to 
develop capabilities in managing human capital, we would re-interpret that as the 
capability to access capabilities, at a distance and, when offshoring becomes 
outsourcing, to access those capabilities across firm boundaries. Such capabilities 
can then usefully be understood as indirect capabilities (Araujo et al. 2003; Loasby 
1998). As we shall, see, many of the terms used rather casually here are 
problematised and nuanced in what follows, but for now it is necessary to explain 
each in a little more detail. 
 
Williamson (1986) claims that ‘A transaction occurs when a good or service is 
transferred across a technologically separable interface’*ref+.  In ‘Where do 
Transactions Come From’, Baldwin and Clark (2006), problematise the taken-for-
granted nature of such interfaces.  Indeed, Loasby (1998, p.142) also draws attention 
to this:  
“…what Williamson calls ‘technological separability’ is not a natural given but 
a human creation”, 
 
Having said that, some interfaces may appear more ‘natural’ *p.23].  Baldwin and 
Clark (2006) use the example of a smithy making cooking utensils and supplying a 
kitchen: the utensils are ‘the products of the smithy and the tools of the kitchen’ 
[p.19]; ‘the cooks do not have to know how to make [utensils] and the smiths do not 
have to know how to make stew’ [p.20].  However, in other situations the 
transaction or ‘pinch-point’ may be far from ‘natural’ and it may take a great deal of 
effort to devise arrangements – either unique to the two firms or more widely used 
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– that allow transactions to take place. Baldwin and Clark (2006) term the costs of 
establishing these arrangements ‘mundane transaction costs’ (hereinafter MTCs).  
 
MTCs comprise the costs of standardizing what is to be transferred, counting the 
units, and compensating the supplier, and transactions between firms, rather than 
transfers within firms take place, where the MTCs are lowest.  In practice this might 
involve up-front definition of product specification details, testing regimes and the 
like. Baldwin and Clark (2006) do not claim that productive systems can be reduced 
to a sequence of transactions, fully-specified ex ante, between firms: there is still 
room for ‘complex and contingent transfers’ *p.45] (such as we find in relational 
contracting) but, by adopting modular design approaches, these can be reduced.  
 
MTCs as developed by Baldwin and Clark are applied to products and production 
chains: in such circumstances, standardization may be achieved by combinations of 
engineering drawings, technical specifications, international standards and the like 
concerning what is to be made, counted, and sold. How can we make transactions 
possible when buying knowledge-intensive services such as IT support, engineering 
design, or consultancy services? This is, in fact, one aspect of the study we report 
here.  
 
As noted by Baldwin and Clark (2006, p.42), ‘for the most part, transaction costs 
economics and contract theory look at static systems of production’. These authors 
are concerned, in their wider project, with the interaction between modularity and 
innovation (Baldwin and Clark 1997), but we wish to draw attention to other aspects 
of the interplay between MTCs and change. First, technological change, initiated by 
the parties involved or more widely, alters the MTC structure and hence, according 
to Baldwin and Clark’s reasoning, has the potential to shift transaction points up and 
down supply chains2. A telling recent example of this is RFID3 technology.  Uses such 
as tracking pallets in warehouses are well known, but some researches  point to a 
future where RFID chips become so cheap and therefore ubiquitous that they can be 
used to track and hence charge us for every move we make (Zipkin 2006); for 
example, the adoption of ‘pay as you throw’ for domestic garbage made possible by 
the use of RFID chips on bins to weight household waste.  In this way MTCs can be 
reduced to such an extent that transactions may be introduced where none were 
previously imaginable.  It is not difficult to identify other instances in economic 
history of technologies that have made standardization, counting and compensating 
                                                 
2
 As we shall see, other forces are at work, possibly in mitigation of the effect of changing MTCs. 
3
 Radio Frequency Identification technology 
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cheaper – for example, shipping containers4 (Donovan 2004).  In sum, technological 
change can move transaction points in production and distribution chains. 
 
However, technological innovation is not the only source of reduction (or indeed, 
increase) in MTCs. Institutional innovation or evolution also changes MTCs. At the 
level of two firms working together, it is likely that they will adapt to one another 
(Hakansson 1982), and establish routines for standardizing, counting and 
compensating. Alternatively, the buyer may become better at drawing up 
specifications and service-level agreements, thereby making the use of the market 
(transaction) more attractive than the use of the firm’s own capacity (transfer), all 
other things being equal. As Langlois (2006) points out, such institutional apparatus  
may be collectively designed and implemented, for example by the development of 
sectoral or international standards.  Thus, MTCs, as Langlois (2006) puts it, have a 
‘secret life’ (in that they are ignored in comparison to the ‘sexy’ transaction costs 
associated with opportunism) and a secret life cycle, in that, for the reasons outlined 
here, they change, they are dynamic. Hence, the point at which transactions can 
most efficiently take place in a sequence of activities or transfers will change, too. 
 
MTCs as outlined here can explain how transactions are made possible in relatively 
stable sequences of processes, and how these transactions may move around or 
multiply as transaction-enabling technologies (e.g. RFID) change.  In instances where 
technological and economic change of a systemic nature are present, a 
manifestation of these more ‘mundane’ transaction costs known as ‘dynamic 
transaction costs’ (Langlois 1992) can explain periodic shifts toward large-scale 
vertical integration. Broadly speaking, the argument goes that, faced with such 
systemic change and the need simultaneously to change several stages in a 
production or service process, these dynamic transaction costs, ‘the costs of 
persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others’ *p99+ are so 
large that the activities are better brought back within the firm. This principle can be 
used to explain why, for example, Ford vertically integrated to introduce mass 
production of automobiles. An alternative, ‘fast and loose’ definition of dynamic 
transaction costs is the ‘costs of not having the capabilities you need, when you need 
them’ (Langlois 1992: 113).  
 
Dynamic transaction costs, then, are a function of capabilities – or lack of them – and 
the need to access them. Are some firms better than others at this? And, hence, 
would such firms face lower dynamic transaction costs and therefore resist the need 
to vertically integrate to effect systemic change? Empirical research (Patel and Pavitt 
2000; Takeishi 2002) has shown that, as it were, firms know more than they do. 
                                                 
4
 Of course, containerization reduced the costs of handling at ports and the like, but the reduction in 
MTCs in, say, chartering a ship for transporting goods is a cost less frequently discussed. 
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What they know determines what they know how to buy or, in other ways, to access 
from external sources. These capabilities have been termed ‘indirect 
capabilities’(Araujo et al. 2003). According to Loasby (1998, p.149): 
“We need not only to know how to do certain things for ourselves, but also 
how to get other things done for us; and just as productive activities require 
direct capabilities, so transactions depend on indirect capabilities. ..Indirect 
capabilities are of two kinds: we may be able to get things done for us either 
by gaining control of other capabilities or by obtaining access to them” 
 
While the offshoring and outsourcing literature has emphasized the ‘glamorous’ 
(Langlois 2006, p.1389) aspects of transaction costs associated with asset specificity 
and opportunism, it is suggested that the ‘mundane’ transaction costs of 
standardizing, counting and compensating for what is to be bought and sold can 
offer important insights.  Furthermore, the related notion of dynamic transaction 
costs, associated with radical systemic change in production systems, seem to offer 
further potential explanatory power in relation to the rapid strategic change that 
offshoring entails. Finally, although some work in offshoring and outsourcing has 
emphasized the respective production capabilities of the buyer and supplier 
respectively, it is contended that the indirect capability – the capability to access 
capabilities – is also of major importance, particularly (although not exclusively) to 
the user or buyer (c.f. Zander and Zander 2005).  These would be important for any 
activity but particularly so in the difficult to define knowledge intensive services.  
METHOD 
This longitudinal study was designed to identify and explore the way three firms 
collaborated to develop and operationalise an offshore business model.  The 
business model at the centre of the case study evolved as manufacturing firm 
attempted to shift its business focus from selling ‘products’ to selling ‘services’ in the 
engineering sector (Eisenhardt 1989; Pettigrew 1990).  The names of all companies 
and individuals referred to in this paper have been changed to protect the identity of 
those involved.   
Using the method of a single case study (Easton 2003; Flyvbjerg 2007; Halinen and 
Tornroos 2005), the exploration of an offshore service business model is likely to 
generate in-depth insight into how firms identify the mundane transaction costs that 
make the offshore business model work.  Empirical data were collected between 
October 2004 and March 2006 from the three key firms that comprise the offshore 
business model; EngCo. (the core firm), InterCo. (the Europe-based supplier and the 
intermediary between EngCo. and DesignCo.) and DesignCo. (the India-based 
supplier).  These companies were selected because of their endeavours to undergo a 
significant level of change that enables them to work together in achieving three 
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agreed objectives: 1) to generate cost savings, 2) to utilize of engineering service 
capabilities and 3) to develop offshore sourcing agreements.   
Table 1: Interviews 
  




EngCo. Senior Buyer Abbey 3 3 2 
 Director Tom 2 2 -  
 Senior Manager Bruce 3 3 2 
 Director Alex 2 2 2 
 Work Stream Head Connor 1 1 1 
 Work Stream Head George 1 1 1 
 Work Stream Head Ben 1 1 1 
InterCo. Director Eve 2 2 2 
 Senior Manager Harry not yet employed 2 2 
 Work Stream Head Sam 2 2 - 
Total no. of interviews 49 
 
The collected data included personal interviews, contracts, minutes of meetings, 
quarterly reports and various procedure and review documents that represented the 
codified knowledge emerging from interactions between all three firms.  Other 
sources of data included detailed field notes that recorded our impressions from 
each visit and archive materials. It was a key requirement of the research design to 
discover who was responsible for developing and managing the business model.  Key 
informants included the heads of each of the key functions involved in the offshore 
business model, the managers and the heads of each work stream from both EngCo. 
and InterCo.  Thus, directors, middle managers and executives workers were 
identified as the most relevant sources as their day-to-day involvement with 
strategic development and operations cast them in this role (Table 1).  
As our objective was to generate in-depth insight, more weight was placed on the 
repeated semi-structured, personal interviews with the above key informants (Yin 1994). 
A total of forty-nine interviews were carried out.  We developed a guide for conducting 
the semi-structured interviews based on the offshore business model.  The guide helped 
us explore the mundane transaction costs identified by the actors as they began to 
develop and operationalise their model.  We consider the companies’ task of ‘learning 
what could be done by the other firm’ as the identification and explication of 
mundane transaction costs.  The efforts to identify transactions and work out what 
would be tradable and how, was a continuous process whereby actors identified and 
defined transactions.  The interviews consisted of open questions based around the 
changes made to business practice and why, how, when and with which actors the 
changes were developed.  The interviews covered the same broad issues with each 
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respondent.  Respondents were re-interviewed approximately every three months 
through the period of the study (subject to availability).   The geographic distance 
between the offshore firm, DesignCo., and the researchers, made it impossible to 
secure face-to-face interviews.  This meant that we had to rely on second hand 
reports from EngCo. and InterCo. respondents and minutes from meetings and 
procedural documents. 
Interviews typically lasted around two hours. They were conducted individually, and were 
audio-recorded and transcribed.  Data analysis placed a significant emphasis on verbatim 
quotations from informants.  All recorded interviews were analyzed via methods of 
inductive reasoning and comparative methods.  Following the procedure recommended 
by Strauss and Corbin (1998), three types of coding were adopted to analyze the data.  
First, ‘open coding’ was used to discover and identify the properties and dimensions of 
concepts in the data.  Second, ‘axial coding’ was employed to link the core categories 
together at the level of properties and dimensions.  Third, ‘selective coding’ was used as a 
process of integrating and refining theory.  To organize this process, a systematic approach 
to the analysis of transcripts was adopted in a procedure akin to that of Turner (1981). 
Analysis was carried out simultaneously with data collection creating an iterative process 
between interviews, literature reviews and analysis.   
TWO-STAGE OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING AT EngCo. 
In this section, a broadly chronological account is given of the process of 
implementing a business model for offshore outsourcing of engineering services by 
EngCo.  As soon as EngCo. established ‘offshoring’ as a key objective for their supply 
network, they began speaking to potential collaborators in order to understand and 
work out the  business model might work.   
Background and the Offshore Business Model 
EngCo. have several thousand of their complex, high-value ($ XXX million) pieces of 
capital equipment in the field, all around the world. These are subject to both 
planned maintenance and repair interventions, sometimes by customers, sometimes 
by EngCo. or their partners. As a result of these interventions, engineering tasks 
become necessary. These begin as local, idiosyncratic repairs and modifications to 
individual pieces of equipment but, where common complaints or improvement 
opportunities are identified, they may be implemented more widely. In any event, 
local repair staff refer the need for re-design or modification back to EngCo. in the 
UK. For some years, EngCo. had sourced locally-based design engineers from local 
agencies to cope with the peaks and troughs associated with industry demand – for 
example the early stages in the life of a new product, when more modification 
requests were received, five draftsmen might be temporarily contracted into any 
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one work stream.  These engineers, who were as likely to be generalist skilled CAD 
operators as sector specialists, (referred to as “bums on seats”) were paid at an 
hourly rate and were managed and supervised in-house by EngCo. engineers.  When 
a specific job was completed, the subcontracted design engineers left.  
 
In 2004, EngCo. undertook a major make/buy review of these engineering services. 
The review highlighted the rapid development of engineering service providers in 
countries with a very low cost base (principally India and China), and suggested that 
significant benefits might be derived from working continuously with a single group 
of ‘offshore’ design engineers. As a result of the make/buy analysis, a four-stage 
contract review process was initiated. 
   






The outcome of the first stage was to conceptualize an offshore business model for 
the strategic sourcing of specified design engineering services.  Following this review, 
EngCo. identified six potential suppliers from their experience and knowledge of the 
marketplace.  These suppliers were contacted and EngCo. personnel spent time with 
each supplier discussing the broad strategic aim of the offshore business model.  
Next, using their new knowledge of potential suppliers, EngCo. identified their ‘most 
desirable outcome’ and their ‘least acceptable alternative’, to create parameters for 
negotiation with potential suppliers.  EngCo. then held a Supplier Conference and 
asked potential suppliers to demonstrate; 1) their potential to develop a supply 
network in the medium and long-term, and 2) their ability to manage outsourced 
work, offshore.   Abbey [EngCo.] explained,  
“by this time [the time of the conference] we’d already got our eye on 
[InterCo.] and [A.N.Other], as possibly the only two [firms] that could really 
provide a solution…” 
  
InterCo. were invited to tender and their tender documentation added details to the 
business model to include the use of an offshore supplier, based in India – DesignCo.   
EngCo. would put ‘work packages’ to InterCo. at a hourly flat-rate for work done, 
regardless of the work type; InterCo. would identify the ‘high-skill’ work, to be 
carried out by themselves, and the ‘low-skill’ work would be outsourced to 
DesignCo.  InterCo. would then return the completed work package to EngCo.  The 
aim was to turn fixed costs in to variable costs and to flatten out the price 
differential between low-skill and high-skill engineering design work.  EngCo. 
      DesignCo. 
Offshore Engineering Services 
Provider 
     InterCo. 
UK Engineering Services 
Provider 
        EngCo. 




designed the contract to provide InterCo. with an incentive to offshore a high 
percentage of work: the more InterCo. sent offshore, the higher their margin.  The 
hourly flat-rate calculation was based on EngCo.’s workload forecasts, with InterCo. 
earning a 6% net margin.  This was expected to involve thirty-five designers at 
InterCo. and fifteen at DesignCo. within twelve months of operations commencing, 
growing to about one hundred in total over the following two years.  
Details of Implementation: The Problem of Packaging 
One of the key challenges faced by EngCo. and InterCo. was learning how to package 
work. As discussed, the need for design work typically comes to light as a result of 
maintenance interventions in the field. When problems arise, requests either for 
defined equipment or for broader problem-solving work are fed back to EngCo. Even 
before the make-buy review, the EngCo. design office was organised into three 
groups or ‘work streams’: Routine Engineering, Tooling and Instrumentation. The 
requests for work are aggregated within these work streams: so, a number of 
individual requests relating to, say, instrumentation are made into a package of 
instrumentation work with a defined work content in terms of number of design 
hours, and sent out to InterCo. They, in turn, identify any lower-skilled elements of 
the package which they can pass on to DesignCo.: these are even more generic, so 
may be just “detail drawing” or similar, no longer categorised in any specific work 
stream. An example of a work package that emerged from the Routine Engineering 
stream was the conversion of drawings from a previous CAD package and from 
pencil drawings to the new Unigraphics CAD system that had recently been adopted 
by EngCo.  This work was sent to InterCo. who in turn outsourced it to DesignCo.  
The conversion of engineering drawings to a Unigraphics format was important so 
that clients and maintenance providers could access drawings on-line.  
 
The Chief EngCo. Engineers from each of these work streams, together with a 
forecasting team, developed forecasts of the type and quantities of work that would 
be outsourced to InterCo.  On the basis of these figures, InterCo. were contracted to 
provide so-many man hours, at an agreed flat rate, over a given period of time (the 
initial contract was for three years).  
 
A second work stream that proved harder to forecast was that of Tooling.  One of 
the principle work packages emerging from this stream was for the design of tools to 
maintain a particular new product.  The complex and necessarily evolutionary 
design-and-build process of the new product used concurrent engineering practices 
that precipitated the design and redesign of tools to maintain it.  After InterCo. 
experienced some quality control issues with DesignCo., InterCo. re-categorised this 
work as ‘high-skill’ and completed the designs themselves.  Sam explained, 
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“We just couldn’t get what we needed from [DesignCo.], because of course 
*pause+ theirs a learning curve, *pause+ and time was tight.” 
 
InterCo. and EngCo. personnel met on a weekly basis to discuss the progress of each 
work package, to re-evaluate and estimated completion times (and costs). These 
meetings were described as, ‘frank’ and ‘challenging’ as the actors often disagreed 
on what need to be done or how – identifying pinch points was difficult.  One 
respondent referred to the walk down the corridor to the meeting room as ‘The 
Green Mile’5. 
 
Finding that DesignCo. did not have such high capabilities as had been expected, 
InterCo. began to keep more of the work to themselves – i.e. they shifted from 
packaging the work to doing a lot of it themselves. Meanwhile, the principle that 
EngCo. would outsource the easier, lower-skilled work was undermined by a 
tendency for many of their design engineers to hold back the easier, lower-skilled 
work for themselves and make available for outsourcing the newer, more 
challenging tasks. These engineers had worked for EngCo. for many years, were near 
the end of their careers and wanted an easy life; furthermore, they were the only 
ones with the detailed knowledge of the work that was to be done, which enabled 
them, at the detailed level, to screen out the work they didn’t want to do. The result 
of this for InterCo. was, once again, that they had more work, with a higher 
proportion of high-skill activities, than they had budgeted for. This led to something 
of a crisis in the relationship between EngCo. and InterCo., which was resolved by an 
increase in the flat rate per hour paid to InterCo. 
DISCUSSION 
Making the Offshore Transaction Possible – and Profitable 
As discussed, much of the offshoring literature takes the definition of what is to be 
offshored as unproblematic. In contrast, in the EngCo. case we see that it is anything 
but. Although the principle of turning one-off, idiosyncratic bespoke tasks into 
progressively more commoditised activities, and buying the right activity at the right 
price as we move up the supply chain seems simple enough, the reality is different. 
The commoditization of processes (Davenport 2005) has a way to go yet, it seems. 
Such a problem was familiar to Edith Penrose: 
“Productive services are not “man-hours”, or “machine-hours” or “bales of 
cotton” or “tons of coal”, but the actual services rendered by the men, 
machines, cotton or coal in the productive process. Although it is manifestly 
services that in this sense that are the actual (physical) “inputs” in production, 
                                                 
5
 The Green Mile is the name given to E Block (death row) of Cold Mountain Penitentiary in the novel 
and movie of the same name. 
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a less specific or more indirect definition is usually required when services 
must be expressed as measurable homogeneous quantities, for example, if it 
desired to measure the cost of certain productive services or to construct 
technological production functions for certain outputs'” (Penrose,1959, pp. 
74–75) 
 
Yet, if offshore outsourcing is to take place, and the promise of low labour costs is to 
be realised, that commoditization and packaging must be effected. Within the firm, 
this would present less of a problem: although there may be some attempt through 
such practices as filling in time-sheets on a Friday afternoon to account for the way 
time has been used, once this becomes the object of an external transaction, the 
basis for the tradability of services, the implications are much greater. This requires 
the standardisation, counting and compensation of which Baldwin and Clark (2006) 
write, and the MTCs that go with them. We argue that, in this case at least, the 
immediate and most important issue is not the Williamsonian (“glamorous”) 
Transaction Costs associated with opportunism and asset specificity, but the 
mundane transaction costs of making outsourcing possible at all. Drawing attention 
to this begs a practical question for managers: are the labour (production) cost 
savings enough to justify the mundane transaction costs of making the outsourcing 
possible? 
 
Furthermore, the experience of EngCo. and InterCo. in trying to make the 
arrangement not only possible but mutually beneficial (i.e. profitable) involved re-
defining the ‘pinch-point’ in the service process, as a result of an initially mistaken 
process of standardisation, counting and compensation that left InterCo. being paid 
for one (easy) thing and actually doing another. Even in the short history of this case, 
then, we reveal not only the secret life of MTCs6, but also their secret life cycle 
(Langlois 2006): or at least, their effect over time, as learning takes place.  
 
By doing the work in-house prior to the review (except for occasional contract 
drawing support), EngCo., it might be argued, had avoided the dynamic transaction 
costs, ‘the costs of persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching 
others’ *p.99] or the ‘costs of not having the capabilities you need, when you need 
them’ (Langlois 1992, p.113). The shift to outsourcing meant that they had to face 
those costs and had to make the judgment as to whether they would be a justifiable 
investment, once they have ‘died down’ (Langlois 1992) and the commodity-like 
work is being conducted at reduced labour-rates.  
                                                 
6
 Some even more ‘hidden’ costs of offshoring, perhaps Stringfellow, A., M. B. Teagarden, and W. Nie 
(2008), "Invisible costs in offshoring services work," Journal of Operations Management, 26 (2), 164-
79. 
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What about Offshoring?: Spatial issues 
The discussion of the previous section concentrates on the organizational relocation 
of activities and the costs associated with making this happen. It might be argued 
that many of these would obtain even if DesignCo. were in the UK: all that would be 
missing (or at any rate much reduced) would be the labour cost differential that 
made the business model attractive in the first place. But recent work in the 
offshoring of IT (Levina and Vaast, 2008), comparing experiences of captive and 
outsourced providers in Russia, suggests that it is the fact of their being in Russia 
that makes the most difference, not whether they are in-house or outsourced.  
 
Perhaps some clues as to the significance of space are present in the way the 
arrangement has unfolded. InterCo. have a dedicated team who are, in essence, full-
time ‘packagers’ and who are permanently located in EngCo.’s offices in the UK. 
EngCo. have staff located in India at DesignCo.’s offices. And it worth noting that the 
old model – of buying in hourly-paid contract CAD operators – involved their being 
located in EngCo.’s offices under the direct (i.e. face-to-face) supervision of EngCo. 
salaried staff. Contrary to the simple claim that ‘if you can do it with someone in the 
next office with the doors closed, you can offshore it’, and consistent with Gertler 
(2003), ‘being there’ is clearly still important. This dimension is absent from Langlois’ 
analyses, even though his notion of dynamic transaction costs ‘the costs of 
persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others’ *p.99] seems to 
depend so much7 on tacit knowledge, usually only developed and transferred face-
to-face. Perhaps dynamic transaction costs are the ‘costs of not having the 
capabilities you need, when and where you need them’, to paraphrase Langlois 
(1992, p.113). 
Back to the Boundaries of the Firm 
The finer grain of the case also point to some further qualifications concerning our 
theoretical framework concerning the boundaries of the firm. Particularly in his 
analysis of dynamic transaction costs, it could be argued that Langlois makes the 
same mistake as Williamson in over-socialising the firm and under-socialising the 
market (Granovetter 1985).  Vertical integration, on that view, seems suddenly to 
make systemic innovation easy8. Witness the behaviour in our case of the long-
serving EngCo. staff who used their special expertise to hold back ‘low-skilled’ work 
that they didn’t want to lose: it is not just (perhaps even much less) offshored staff in 
low-wage economies who like to do as little as possible for as much pay as possible 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
                                                 
7
 ‘as we have argued, capabilities involve tacit knowledge that can be gained only by a long process of 
apprenticeship’ (Langlois 1992, p.113) 
8
 This also has a spatial dimension – Storper, M. and R. Salais (1997), Worlds of production: the action 
frameworks of the economy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
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In other ways also, the boundaries of the firm are not so clear-cut. As noted in 
passing by Metters (2008), outsourced providers may be ex-employees of the client 
firm9. This is the case here. Indeed, the senior manager at InterCo. is an ex EngCo. 
employee, and this helped in all sorts of ways, in InterCo.’s being given the contract 
in the first place, and in subsequent implementation. Harry explained, 
“I know how things are done at *EngCo.+, that helps a lot…. and of course 
it’s knowing who’s got the responsibility, *pause+ and the authority,… to 
institute changes we want to make.”   
 
While existing analyses (Araujo et al. 2003; Loasby 1998) have discussed indirect 
capabilities, these are usually thought of from the perspective of the firm buying – or 
at least accessing – external capabilities.  Here, it seems, the indirect capabilities of 
the supplier are also extremely important; of course, in this instance, InterCo. are 
both supplier and subcontractor (c.f. Olsson et al 2008, whose case is structurally 
similar) in this two-stage offshore outsourcing process.  
 
As noted elsewhere (Ellram et al. 2008; Metters 2008), staff turnover among 
offshore service providers is often very high, and this can undermine reliability of 
service provision. This has been so in the EngCo. case, and the solution has been that 
a certain number of staff at DesignCo. have been ring-fenced.  Instead of being 
employed at an hourly rate, they become salaried members of staff at DesignCo., but 
have job security because of EngCo. commitment and investment.  The staff are 
dedicated to EngCo. work.  Consequently, this shifts some of the variable cost back 
into a fixed cost for EngCo.  Here are echoes of the ‘naturalisation’ of offshore staff 
in the cases reported by Olsson et al. (2008). Once again, managers are left asking 
themselves – where does that leave the boundaries of the firm, bearing in mind they 
also work alongside ‘embedded’ EngCo. staff seconded to India. And what does all 
this do for the eventual realized cost savings? 
Captive/Outsource; Domestic/Offshore 
By now it will be clear that, although they might provide a simple starting-point, neat 
two-by-two matrices (Metters 2008) defining four-part typology of service delivery 
designs are problematic. Organizational and geographic relocation interpenetrate 
one another in complex and shifting ways.  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The study of the offshore outsourcing of knowledge-intensive work is as yet young – 
not surprisingly, given that the technological wherewithal to communicate, cheaply, 
great volumes of voice, text and graphical data across the world is such a recent 
                                                 
9
 He also mentions, fleetingly, co-location (Metters, 2008) 
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development. Most studies so far have drawn attention to the risks involved in the 
combination of geographical and organization relocation with the peculiarities of 
service activities, and have tended to emphasise the problems that may arise from 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of suppliers, rather taking for granted that what 
is to be outsourced can be defined. In contrast, the theoretical approach and the 
case presented here draw attention to the ‘mundane’ costs of making services 
tradable in the first place. Our empirical evidence suggests that these are at least as 
important as the ‘sexy’ transaction costs associated with ‘hold-up’ problems.  
 
The analysis also draws attention to, and exemplifies in some detail, the impact of 
firms’ indirect capabilities (Loasby 1998) on those mundane transaction costs. 
Furthermore, while these have previously typically been discussed from the 
perspective of the buying firm or, more generally, the firm accessing external 
capabilities, the case draws attention to the role of indirect capabilities for the 
selling firm, or the provider of productive capabilities. This is a novel insight, we feel, 
with implications for marketing theory. The case adds a further layer of complexity 
and interest because it involves a two stage outsourcing process, and hence rests to 
some extent on the doubly indirect capabilities – its capabilities in accessing 
someone else’s indirect capabilities - of the lead contractor.  
 
Our analysis also adds, albeit briefly, a geographical dimension to the abstractions of 
mundane transaction costs and dynamic transaction costs. Although proximity and 
face-to-face tacit knowledge transfer is implicit in some aspects of a capabilities-
based extension or re-consideration of Williamsonian TCE, such as that of Langlois, it 
does remain just that – implicit. Offshore outsourcing of services, it seems, presents 
a wonderful empirical opportunity to explore in a new way the spatial facets of firm 
and inter-firm capability development, especially, as in this case, where the supply 
network and the activities being carried out are subject to rather rapid and 
disruptive change. 
 
These findings have very important implications for management, identifying and 
bringing to centre stage this important category of costs, costs which must be 
considered very seriously in the calculus of any decision to outsource, but especially 
where the mundane transaction costs may be increased by geographical, cultural or 
linguistic difference. It also underlines the need for an understanding of, and the 
development of, firms’ indirect capabilities. It may also point to new business 
opportunities – post-industrial ‘peculiar trades’ (Smith 1976), one might say – for 
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